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Abstract 
 
  
The relationship between science and medicine, while having generated some of the 
greatest advancements of the 20th century and thus having provided us with innumerable 
benefits, has been detrimental to the ability of the physician to not simply treat the disease but to 
truly care for the patient. This “biologizing” of the patient often, ironically, interferes with the 
ability of the physician to treat the patient’s suffering. The alleviation of suffering can be 
considered to be the end goal of medicine. But suffering, by nature, is a multifaceted and 
complex condition. To better understand suffering, one must first better understand the person or, 
even, what is meant by “person.” A growing movement in the past two decades amongst 
physicians and philosophers has been to use a phenomenological approach, or simply an 
understanding of experience through a first-person account, to better understand the clinical 
encounter, the effects of pain and illness on the body, and the nature of suffering. This approach 
is used here to introduce aspects of a larger problem within medicine and our culture in 
general—and that is our tendency to seek a cure before we have understood the problem. We 
make tremendous efforts to protect and preserve our lives—in good health, from death—but we 
rarely stop to wonder what we are preserving them for. This paper serves as an introduction to 
larger problems both within and outside of medicine, to the phenomenological approach, and to 
the many aspects of the clinical encounter.  
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“Now we feel profoundly the limitation of our being, and there is something in us which gladly 
holds onto these chains—for if the divine in us was not limited by any resistance, we would 
know nothing outside of ourselves, and so also nothing of ourselves.” (Holderlin, Hyperion) 
 
Introduction  
The Birth of the Clinic and the Flexner Report 
Major advancements in science and technology over the past two centuries have armed 
medicine with the capacities to mediate many of the imbalances and disruptions that throw the 
human body into illness. As the modern clinic developed in late 18th and early 19th century 
France, the incorporation of scientific positivism (the view that the world operates according to 
general laws and that truth can only be determined from empirical evidence) enabled physicians 
to actually see what was going on inside a sick body, not simply to resign to inference: “Open up 
a few corpses: you will dissipate at once the darkness that observation alone could not dissipate” 
(Foucault 146). The emergence of this method of seeing, where the gaze of the knowing 
physician quietly and freely meets its object in the body of the patient or in the diseased organs 
of the corpse, marked a fundamental shift in Western medicine from the traditions of the 
preceding 2,000 years to the modern medicine practiced today.  
In the United States, this scientific foundation in medicine was not firmly established 
until the early 20th century. Up to this point, American medical schools lacked support, 
legitimacy, and quality teaching and were failing in comparison to their European counterparts 
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(Germany in particular, which followed a “hyper-rational system of science”). In 1910, set with 
the task of reforming medical education in the United States and the financial backing of the 
Rockefellers, Abraham Flexner produced a 300 page-long report evaluating the condition and 
effectiveness of medical schools across the U.S. His report suggested, most prominently, that 
medical education be science-based and that the advancement of scientific knowledge be the 
“defining ethos of the modern physician.” This established the “biomedical model as the gold 
standard of medical training” (Duffy 1). The value this gave to medicine in the 20th century 
cannot be understated: “The Flexner Report set American medicine on a course that was fueled 
by the energy of scientific discovery. Those discoveries have immeasurably improved the lives 
of all human beings, and it is difficult to cavil in the face of such accomplishments” (10).  
But these advances in the science of medicine detracted from the simultaneous 
development in the so-called art of medicine; it was not long after the “Flexner Report” was 
released that older physicians, like Francis Peabody (1881-1927), began to notice that younger 
students were learning “a great deal about the mechanism of disease, but very little about the 
practice of medicine—or, to put it more bluntly, they are too ‘scientific’ and do not know how to 
take care of patients” (“The Care of the Patient”).  
Current affairs in medicine 
The current climate of medicine in the U.S. is messy to say the least. The issues that 
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plague medicine and impede the ability of physicians and other health care workers to deliver 
quality care to their patients are many: costs are excessive and spiraling out of control; much of 
clinical care is fragmented and spread amongst subspecialties; litigation and increased scrutiny of 
medical records and decision making in the interest of insurance companies is impinging on the 
freedom of the physician; and lastly, patients tend to be “biologized,” or simply reduced to their 
diseases (Barondess 9). Of interest to this paper is this latter issue, which is rooted in the 
aforementioned integration of science and medicine in the early 19th and 20th centuries and which 
has permeated clinical practice and hindered the ability of the physician to actually care for the 
patient ever since.  
Physicians writing today on this issue explain that it is not science that is the source of 
the problem—to say this would be to discount the significance of medical science—but rather, it 
is the relationship of one to the other that requires readjustment:  
 
In the United States, the power of science and the science faculty rules the medical 
schools and determines much of their curriculum…unfortunately, certain fundamental 
ideas of science—such as valuing individually verifiable facts over systems, like whole 
persons; glorifying objectivity at the expense of disparaged subjectivity; and creating a 
duality that separates nature (including the body) from the person that mimics the old 
mind-body duality—help perpetuate impersonality in medicine. (Cassell xiii)  
 
The clinical encounter 
The emphasis of this paper will be on the clinical encounter—that is, on the interaction 
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between the physician (even though other health care professionals are increasingly engaged in 
similar relationships, for purposes of simplicity and of primary interest, largely only the 
physician will be referred to here) and his or her patient. The impetus for this focus comes from 
multiple sources, not least of which is the unique positioning of the clinical physician between 
the language and scope of medical science on the one hand and the realm of the humanities—the 
activities of the individual—on the other. Although greater forces (such as capitalism and 
biopolitics) are also at play and continue to shape medicine and the way we, as humans, view 
ourselves, this clinical encounter remains the crux of present medical practice: “Modern medical 
science and technology will change the nature of the medical meeting, but medical practice will, 
without doubt, at the same time…remain a meeting between persons” (Svenaeus 29).  
Defining an approach 
Phenomenology, most simply described as the study of experience from the first-person 
point of view, provides a means to overcome this “biologizing” issue in medicine. As Fredrick 
Svenaeus points out, “Even if the experienced practitioner knows that illness is not disease, but 
rather a life-form, and that medicine is not only science, but primarily dialogue and 
understanding, he presently lacks a language for articulating this knowledge in a systematical 
way” (5). Phenomenology, in its emphasis on the first-person experiences of individuals, can 
provide such a vocabulary. A growing body of literature and interest on the topic of 
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phenomenology and medicine has emerged over the last 20 years, and so the essential nature of 
this paper is to bring attention to a number of issues that surround and emerge out of the clinical 
encounter, while simply providing an introduction to the larger and more detailed discussions 
currently being had by physicians and philosophers alike.  
 By better understanding the illness experiences of the patients they are treating, 
physicians can better care for patients as Peabody, back in 1927, urged them to do. Ultimately 
both those giving and seeking care must consider medicine is for. This is a discussion that could 
indeed fill volumes, but is worth mentioning here because, as it seems, unless a person truly 
understands what he or she is doing something for, unless an enterprise has an end goal—and 
one as enormous as medicine surely does—then it is easy to lose touch with the importance of 
the endeavor, with oversights and apathies as likely byproducts along the way. As we will see, a 
number of physicians have articulated the end goal of medicine most simply as the alleviation of 
suffering. Presupposing that this is indeed the goal of medicine, we would need both a better 
understanding of suffering and of person, for as we will see, suffering is an affliction of persons 
not simply of bodies (Cassell xii).  
Current trends in medicine, such as the “biologizing” of the sick person, unfortunately 
have had the effect of undermining what medicine seeks to create: a state of health, free from 
suffering. In our very attempts to live more fulfilling lives, free of illness and suffering, we have 
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sought out better drugs, treatments, and cures, and science (biology) has delved further and 
further into our bodies and their smallest components. Driving these efforts are our hopes that the 
more that we can understand and the more that we can cure, the better, longer, and more 
meaningful lives we will have. As we will see, however, disease is only one source of 
suffering—and needless to say, its treatment is usually greatly beneficial. Yet while we are 
searching down the rabbit hole for the causes of and treatments for all our afflictions, we often 
forget about that which we are trying to protect—our humanity. The experience of illness has a 
particular effect on a person that, while limiting, impeding, or damaging, seems to stir the 
awareness of that person in a way that is not usually thought of as occurring through the body 
(rather, such effects are talked about in regards to the mind, the thoughts, emotions, etc). The 
same will be discussed in regards to death. Both illness and death are events or experiences that 
tend to instigate the search for meaning (and whatever that might mean) in a person’s life. 
 This paper hopes to introduce some of these ideas using a phenomenological, or 
experience-based, approach. The topics of the sick body, suffering, death, the clinical encounter, 
and the role of uncertainty science and medicine are all discussed, albeit briefly, in hopes to 
better elaborate on the aforementioned ideas.  
“To biologize” 
Before delving into a discussion of phenomenology, let us pause to consider what 
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“biologizing” a person really means and how this might relate to the larger scope of this project. 
We are all made of the same “stuff”—the 20,000 or so protein-coding genes that make up 
the human genome, the billions of cells that give rise to the many tissues, the signaling pathways 
that connect and control the organ systems, all covered in skin and filled with blood… We are 
biological beings. From the discovery of the structure of DNA in 1953 to the completion of a 
draft of the human genome in 2001, we have uncovered a tremendous amount about our biology, 
about how life works on a molecular level, in the last sixty years alone. The more that we know, 
however, the more we realize how truly complicated we are. The strict mind-body dualism that 
has dominated Western thought for centuries is slowly breaking down as we continue to uncover 
much about the relationship of our minds and bodies, about how our physiology affects our 
emotions and vice versa. Despite these growing understandings, however, and perhaps because 
of them, we continue to search for a biological basis to everything that we do and feel—from 
consciousness to love and so on.  
 But, surely we do not consider ourselves just to be our biology.  
 
Between the idea and the reality, between the motion and the act…the conception and the 
creation…the desire and the spasm…the potency and the existence…falls the 
Shadow…We are the hollow men, the stuffed men. (T.S. Eliot, The Hollow Men, 1925) 
 
The mysteries and paradoxes of the human being that we have wrestled with for the past few 
millennia, will these, too, one day be reduced to some biological explanation? Do we want them 
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to be? Again, we do so much to protect and preserve ourselves, to maintain our health so that, we 
often say, we can live more meaningful lives. What becomes of the meaning—where we will 
find it, how we will express it—when we have reduced ourselves down to the last atom? The 
things for which we care most, I.A. Richards says, are the in-betweens, the “vast corpus” 
between that which can be discussed as fact and that which is accepted by convention: 
 
There are subjects—mathematics, physics, and the descriptive sciences supply some of 
them—which can be discussed in terms of verifiable facts and precise hypotheses. There 
are other subjects—the concrete affairs of commerce, law organisation and police work—
which can be handled by rules of thumb and generally accepted conventions. But in 
between is the vast corpus of problems, assumptions, adumbrations, fictions, prejudices, 
tenets; the whole world, in brief, of abstract opinion and disputation about matters of 
feeling. To this world belongs everything about which civilised man cares most. I need 
only instance ethics, metaphysics, morals, religion, aesthetics, and the discussions 
surrounding liberty, nationality, justice, love, truth, faith and knowledge to make this 
plain. (Richards 7)   
 
In medicine, “biologizing” the sick person has meant treating the disease as a set of 
biologic phenomena to the “neglect of associated, illness-related human needs” (Barondess 10). 
It has meant referring to a patient as her disease (e.g. “acute pancreatitis” in room 331) rather 
than the person’s name (e.g. “Ms. Dohm with acute pancreatitis” in room 331). And while this 
reduction has been necessary for the treatment of a number of diseases, the physician, whose 
subject is a person, cannot treat his or her patient the same as would a scientist an object of study 
in the laboratory:  
Emily Arrington Dohm  The Suffering Body 
 
 11 
 
Disease in man is never exactly the same as disease in an experimental animal, for in man 
the disease at once affects and is affected by what we call the emotional life. Thus, the 
physician who attempts to take care of a patient while he neglects this factor is as 
unscientific as the investigator who neglects to control all the conditions that may affect 
his experiment. (Peabody, “The Care of the Patient”)  
 
A physician must consider—just as a patient must—that a person is the subject of medicine, and 
with this comes all the inconsistencies, struggles, depths, and uncertainties that make us human.  
A phenomenological approach  
Although views and interests vary amongst various phenomenologists, one can discuss a 
“phenomenological approach” because of the commonalities that link the movement. Perhaps 
most distinctively is Edmund Husserl’s (1859-1938) notion that it is to the things themselves to 
which we should look—that instead of ignoring everyday experience, we should seek to better 
understand and reflect upon it (Aho and Aho, 2008; Toombs, 2001).  
In the Handbook of Phenomenology and Medicine, S. Kay Toombs effectively 
summarizes the utility of a phenomenological approach to medicine and the discussion of 
suffering, “person,” and the clinical encounter. First, phenomenology seeks to articulate the 
distinction between the everyday experiences of life and the theoretical accounts of those 
experiences. This plays a role, for example, in recognizing the difference between a clinician’s 
theoretical understanding of a disease and a patient’s firsthand account of his or her experience 
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with an illness. Second, phenomenology opens up a means to actively reflect on one’s 
experience, that is, to question assumed truths about the world as well as to develop an 
awareness of the “colorings” of our various experiences. A physician must be aware not only of 
the disease that afflicts a person but also—and sometimes more importantly—of the context in 
which that disease appears: what it is about this person’s lifestyle, background, and so on that 
might change how the disease manifests and how treatment might then differ between patients 
with the same disease (Toombs 2; Cassell).  
Third, through the motif “to the things themselves,” phenomenology emphasizes the 
importance of firsthand experience, e.g. how it is that a person perceives and responds to their 
environment. As we will see, illness is a narrative, and the communication of this story by the 
patient to his or her physician has considerable practical value in the clinical experience. And 
lastly, many of the themes investigated by phenomenologists—such as the body, the nature of 
existence, temporality, and intersubjectivity—are relevant, perhaps more than anywhere else, to 
the field of clinical medicine (Toombs, 2001, 3).  
It is prudent to note here, however, a criticism of phenomenology, articulated by Arthur 
Kleinman, psychiatrist and medical anthropologist: “The chief problem with phenomenological 
theory is that it has over time become a special language whose conventions, accepted by 
initiates, are opaque to general readers. The neologisms invented by Edmund Husserl, Martin 
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Heidegger…and others obscure more than they illuminate about the felt quality of the flow of 
experience” (1995, 276). Kleinman recognizes and lauds phenomenological theory for its 
opening up of means to talk about and understand human suffering, but he also criticizes its 
“predilection for an esoteric terminology,” which has in turn prevented its insights from reaching 
a larger population (Svenaeus, 48).  
Despite recognition of these limitations, the ideas, perspectives, and conversations 
offered by a phenomenological approach are of primal interest to this discussion of suffering and 
personhood. Because the amount that has been written about these theories in the context of 
medicine—and even more specifically on medicine’s address of suffering—in the last two 
decades is immense, this paper is by no means a comprehensive look at phenomenological 
theory. Instead, this is an introduction to an approach that serves as an appropriate vehicle to 
better understand what it means to be human in this world and thus what is meant by human 
suffering. Some of these insights, which are more or less intuitive but that oftentimes go 
unarticulated, will be discussed here.  
The world 
As described by John Russon in Human Experience, the phenomenological approach has 
in part been to challenge us to be wary of traditional views of the world. Rather than 
understanding ourselves to be “on one side and the world on the other...as discrete agents facing 
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a world about which we must make choices,” we might better understand this relationship as far 
more interconnected, as a sort of dialogue (9-10). Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), one of the first 
to articulate this framework of inquiry, describes all experience as “hermeneutic,” that is, as a 
relationship or interaction, one that involves an interpretative act, between subject and object 
(Aho and Aho 11). As we will see, the clinical encounter is particularly illustrative of this 
hermeneutic relationship. The objects and people that surround us, making up our world, place a 
demand on us, just as we do them. In a sense, the “I” is derived from the world just as “natural 
laws” or “human nature” are really no more than products of history and culture, according to 
this phenomenological perspective (11-12). 
One traditional view is that the universe precedes human understanding and that matter, 
nature, the laws of physics, and reality are objective and can be separated from human-derived 
influences, e.g. culture, politics, etc. Another view, however, contests that the universe only 
exists because we perceive it (part of the thoughts surrounding the Anthropic Principle), and thus 
it would follow that reality is a subjective matter. In either case, however, nature, whether 
objective or subjective, must be translated by human understanding to become substantial to us. 
Science, in a sense, is a translation of the unknown to the known in means that we, as humans, 
can understand. If this is what science is, then it cannot remain unaffected by our limitations. 
And as such, it cannot remain unmolded by culture. To become aware of these prejudices by 
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means of reflection is essentially what it means to adopt a “phenomenological attitude.”  
 We exist insofar as we are situated in the world. A person grows to learn how the world 
is, but she does not learn that the world is (Russon, “On Human Identity,” 308). The world 
already is; the way we interact with the world is precisely that which makes the world how it is 
to us. In other words, we are born into an already existing world, with already established rules. 
And it is the objects and people that we are surrounded by, both voluntarily and involuntarily, 
that dictate our experiences—our family, for example, is how we become “socialized” in the 
world, and we look to those closest to us for a sense of shared meaning and purpose. The world 
itself is a shared space, that is, it would not be “the world” were it solely my own. It is precisely 
because the world is shared that it is something (Russon, Human Experience). We differ in how 
we appear to the world, and because of this our experience in the world differs. Each person’s 
interaction is “colored” by an infinitely varying combination of factors—education, geography, 
race, interests, needs, and so on.  
The body 
Needless to say, our body is the vehicle through which we participate in the world: “The 
world that is for me is beyond me—it is a reality with which I can engage only by means of real 
bodily interaction” (Russon, “On Human Identity,” 308). In this sense, the human body is a 
fragile, finite interface, precariously maintained between two infinite universes, that without and 
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that within—“a cosmos within a cosmos” (308). To be embodied, this “is the very matrix of all 
our experience, all our engagement with significance” (Russon, Human Experience, 23). 
How we think about our bodies, then, influences how we think about our world and our 
relationship to it. Toombs quotes philosopher David Abram to elucidate one aspect of this 
embodiment: “We may think of the sensory body as a kind of circuit that completes itself only in 
things, and in the world…it is primarily through my engagement with what is not me that I effect 
the integration of my senses, and thereby experience my own unity and coherence” (Toombs 6).  
While much has been—and can be—said about the body, it is of use to consider another 
major goal of phenomenology: to disrupt the mind-body dualism that, though birthed in early 
Western philosophical thought, was popularized by Rene Descartes (1596-1650) in the 17th 
century. Most simply, this Cartesian dualism considers the thinking mind to be separate from the 
material body. Critics of the tendency of physicians to “biologize” the sick person cite this 
separation as central to the problem:  
 
If health care practitioners focus their attention almost exclusively on the body/object as a 
malfunctioning anatomico-physiological entity and ignore (or de-emphasize) the patient’s 
lived experience of bodily disturbance, then important factors of illness (such as 
interpretations, emotions, desires, worldly involvements, cultural background, and so 
forth) are ignored—despite the fact that such factors play a crucial role in the course of 
disease and in therapeutic effectiveness. (Toombs 8) 
 
The Cartesian dualism is disrupted when we consider the body as the nucleus of our 
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experience in the world, as the material through which all thoughts, emotions, and gestures are 
generated. As Drew Leder, physician and phenomenologist whose The Absent Body delves 
deeply into the felt-ness of the body, points out: “If the body as a lived structure is a locus of 
experience, then one need not ascribe this capability to a decorporealized mind. The self is 
viewed as an integrated being” (5).  
Probably most apparent to us is that the body we experience is not the same as the body 
that is observed by the medical gaze. That is, we think of our body as the lived body, the one felt 
and understood as ours on a daily basis; we do not typically consider the physiological body, the 
actual matter, cells, and organs that can be observed, measured, and manipulated. The German 
words Leib (the self, the body as we experience it) and Korper (the body as matter, as a 
complexity of processes and functions) are often used to describe this distinction (Aho and Aho; 
Leder; Toombs).  
Leder warns, however, of the overemphasis of this distinction (of the use by 
phenomenologists of Leib and Korper), with the possibility that such a “partialized conception” 
of the lived body might simply generate a new dualism. To avoid this, he points out first that, 
intrinsically, the lived body is both subject and an object observed and interacted with by others, 
not solely a first-person entity. And that “to be a lived body is always also to be a physical body 
with bones and tendons, nerves and sinews, all of which can be scientifically characterized. 
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These are not two different bodies. Korper is itself an aspect of Leib, one manner in which the 
lived body shows itself” (6).  
The paradox of the body 
A notable aspect of the lived body is its paradoxical nature. Often we do not think about 
our bodies until they are hurting or functioning differently. The body is both that which is most 
self and most other (i.e. something that is separate from or different than me; to be “an other” is 
to be something outside of my reach or beyond my full comprehension). Take, for example, the 
process of digestion: A man feels hungry, so he finds something, say, a sandwich, to eat. His 
bodily hunger drives him to take action to satisfy it. Perhaps he develops feelings of anger or 
agitation until these needs are met. Either way, what he feels is that “I’m hungry.” Once the food 
is eaten, however, it undergoes the process of digestion. This is not a conscious process; the man 
is not directing the actions of his organs. The peristaltic contraction of the muscles along his 
digestive tract, the secretion of enzymes from his pancreas, or the movement of sugars and other 
molecules into his bloodstream—these are all being done without the awareness of the man 
(Leder 37-39).  
Once the man’s hunger is relieved, his body is no longer central to his focus—that is, 
until he later feels the need to find a restroom, or perhaps the sandwich did not “sit well,” and he 
feels a discomfort in his “stomach” for the rest of the day (37-39). The process of digestion takes 
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place largely without the man’s knowing or control of it, and yet it is taking place in his body.  
For people whose body is functioning normally, its demands are not consciously placed 
at the center of their focus (Cassell). Again, it is not usually until something is wrong that we pay 
attention to and wonder at this other: “My body is ‘mine most of all, yet [it is also] other most of 
all’… Indeed the very times when it is most other than me are precisely the moments when I 
experience it as most truly my own. This aching knee…the knee of which I was earlier entirely 
oblivious, is my aching knee; this back pain my own; this headache mine” (Aho and Aho 19).  
There is an “uncanniness” of this sensing of the body as other than me: “When the body 
is rendered opaque through loss of function, we become aware of its alien presence” (Toombs 7; 
Leder 82). We realize that much of what happens to or in our bodies is beyond our control—
something that can cause distress, worry, and even total helplessness. Sickness and injury 
heighten this awareness.  
The sick body 
Often when we are sick, our bodies are all that we can think about. In sickness, the 
boundaries of our world collapse in around us—the world shrinks (Aho and Aho; Leder). Pain 
plays a role in this shrinkage: the cramping of the stomach, the tightening of the neck, and the 
contraction, contortion, pinching of the muscles (Aho and Aho 116). More aware of our own 
body, its pain and discomfort, we therefore become less aware of anything outside of our body; 
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we experience a cessation in our relationship with others and our habituated environment 
(Russon, “On Human Identity”). Not only physically—a person is contained in the intensive care 
unit (ICU) or in his or her bed at home—but also emotionally, the sick body separates: “the 
inability to feel into the world forecloses any possibility of emotional connection to others” (Aho 
and Aho 119). It can be seen, then, why a person with a chronic illness often becomes 
accustomed to loneliness—not only because the sick body retreats from the world, but also 
because others, even close family and friends, cannot truly comprehend the illness experience of 
that person (Toombs 388).  
A body that begins to fail or that can no longer do what it used to undoubtedly changes a 
person’s relationship to the world: “As the means by which one interacts with the world, the 
lived body makes possible the existential projects that are expressive of one’s personhood. 
Consequently, the disruption of bodily capacities has a significance that far exceeds that of 
simple mechanical dysfunction” (Toombs 7). Take professional basketball player Steve Nash as 
an example. He has spent the last 18 years of his life playing in the NBA. Surely, as a 
professional athlete, the functioning of his body is the center of his focus—a clear example of 
how a person’s body defines and determines his or her world. At forty years old, however, he has 
reached a point where his body is being riddled with injuries that have significantly limited the 
number of games he has played in his last two years with the L.A. Lakers. Nash now finds 
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himself confronted with the reality of these limitations: “I feel like there’s something that I can’t 
quite put my finger on…it feels like it’s blocking me, like this kind of dark presence. I’ve started 
to wonder if that feeling again…is it the truth, that I am done?” (The Finish Line). 
The world of a professional athlete is conspicuously constructed around his or her 
body—what it can do, how it functions and moves in space dictates the athlete’s place in the 
world. As soon as the athlete’s body begins to fail, he or she no longer belongs to the world of 
his or her sport and must begin to re-familiarize with another part of his or her life. The body-
world interaction of the athlete is visible to us. And while in some ways it might seem that the 
condition of an athlete no longer able to keep playing his or her sport is trivial compared to the 
condition of a person, say, diagnosed with a brain tumor, whose entire life is subsequently 
upended, to a degree, these cases are not so different. As Nash explains, “Every athlete, when 
they lose their skills, they lose a big part of themselves, a part that they built their life around. 
You know, it’s been a huge part of their purpose, self-esteem, identity, so when the skill or 
ability goes, it’s like there’s been a death. It’ll never be the same again” (The Finish Line).  
Suffering 
Now to better understand suffering, let us first consider that “suffering is an affliction of 
the person, not of the body” (Cassell xii). Although a person is an effect of his or her physical 
properties—from the atoms and molecules to the cells and tissues to the greater systems and 
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physiological processes—a person is by no means just his or her biology. We experience the 
world through our bodies, but when asked in earnest who we are, we will not typically respond 
with a simple description of our biology or bodily constitution: “A person is an embodied, 
purposeful, thinking, feeling, emotional, reflective, relational human individual existing through 
time in a narrative sense” (Cassell and Rich, “Intractable End-of-Life Suffering”).   
A phenomenological account is one of first-person experience—how I experience the 
world, how I interact with others, how I look for meaning. But the legitimacy of our subjectivity 
is not undermined by the fact (and thus should not exclude) that we are also objects that can be 
observed by others, scientifically characterized, and so on. As Leder emphasizes, “Korper is 
itself an aspect of Leib” (6). The physical body is a part of the lived body that we experience as 
our personhood. This personhood, as we understand from our discussion on “the world,” is not 
separable from the world, or in other words, we exist or are who we are because of our 
interactions in the world and with others. And so when thinking about a person, we cannot ignore 
his or her context, just as the practitioner of medicine cannot ignore the person when thinking 
about the disease: “Persons do not exist except as imbedded in the matrix of their 
society…thinking about or trying to understand the word ‘person’ separate from his or her 
society is like thinking about or trying to understand the word ‘person’ apart from language in 
general and the fact that language is a human capacity that presupposes that humans live in 
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groups” (Cassell 150).  
While Steve Nash may or may not consider himself to be suffering, what he describes—
losing a big part of oneself, there being a sort of death, things never being the same—is 
something experienced by many people (most, if not all, actually) at some point in their lives. 
This sense of loss, death, and irreversible change beyond the control of the individual, 
accompanied by fear or anxiety, forms the basis of human suffering. Eric Cassell, retired internal 
medicine physician and author of The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine, considers 
what it is that makes suffering an affliction of persons (as opposed to bodies): “Most generally, 
suffering can be defined as the state of severe distress associated with events that threaten the 
intactness of the person” (32).  
The complexity of the history, implications, and various interpretations of suffering 
cannot be understated—it is inextricable from the “human condition.” In the words of C.S. 
Lewis, “Try to exclude the possibility of suffering which the order of nature and the existence of 
free-wills involve, and you find that you have excluded life itself” (The Problem of Pain).  
One society that dealt readily with suffering was that of the ancient Greeks. In a manner 
that might seem strange today, the ancient Greeks celebrated suffering as part of life. At festivals 
dedicated to Dionysus, the god of wine and fertility, they would gather to watch and perform the 
tragedies of playwrights Sophocles and Aeschylus while also imbibing in wine and reveling in 
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song and dance. The ancient Greeks saw that in order to live fully, one must embrace all aspects 
of life—its joys as well as sorrows, the possibilities of greatness as well as the limitations of 
mortality.  
 This acceptance of suffering, however, did not mean that the ancient Greeks did not 
seek to alleviate it. In a century of much growth, change, and turmoil (the Peloponnesian Wars, 
the teachings of Socrates, etc), Hippocrates (ca. 460-370 BCE), from the island of Kos, laid the 
foundations of modern medicine. Recognizing that “health is the greatest of all human 
blessings,” Hippocratic medicine sought to restore balance to the body and to care for and reduce 
the suffering of the sick—“this too is part of the physician’s art: to do away with that which 
causes pain, and by taking away the cause of his suffering to make him sound” (Volume IV, 
trans. 1931).  
If the goal of medicine is indeed to treat suffering, Cassell’s definition of it as “the 
distress of whole persons whose intactness is threatened or disintegrating” demands that 
physicians better understand the person and not simply that which can be known about the 
person’s body by gazing upon it through the eyes of the clinician (or the hands of the surgeon, 
the images of the MRI machine, or the computer screen of the geneticist). What Cassell 
describes has more or less become the accepted definition of suffering amongst those writing on 
this topic today, e.g. a number of phenomenologists and physicians (Aho and Aho; Svenaeus; 
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Toombs).  
Simply refining one’s understanding of suffering does not lead to its melioration—if 
anything, all that is realized is how complex this task is. But if one is going to successfully 
contribute to the reduction of another’s suffering, it will be by taking into consideration all that 
that person is and thus all that might contribute to their suffering. As we will see, however, this 
expanded understanding of suffering might simply make one aware of the possibility that it is 
never fully eliminated, at least, that it is never fully within the scope of the physician to achieve 
this.  
The “intactness” of a person summarizes a state of synchrony between the many pieces 
that constitute a person (“I am large; I contain multitudes.”-Walt Whitman). Needless to say, that 
which affects one piece will affect the whole. Suffering can arise when a person is no longer able 
to be in the world in a familiar way, or when his or her “face to the world” is no longer the same 
(Cassell 274). For the professional athlete who is forced to retire because of injury or a mother 
who is going to lose her only child to leukemia, the distresses and fears surrounding these events 
may be more of a burden than the initial injury or diagnosis itself: “What is threatened or injured 
is the integrity or intactness of the person as a person. The injury to the person and the distress of 
suffering become more important—loom larger than the actual physical symptom, disease, or life 
situation that produced the suffering” (274).  
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 A physician cannot see this when his or her sole focus is on the disease or dysfunctional 
part, or when he or she fails to listen to the narrative of the patient, of which symptoms and 
habits are only a part. The overlooking of these elements, in turn, has the potential to do more 
harm to the patient than the disease itself (which seemingly contradicts the purpose of the 
treatment and fails to adhere to the vow of doctors per the Hippocratic Oath to “do no harm”). In 
his 1927 Harvard address, Peabody gives the following example, where in a not uncommon case, 
a patient is treated as his disease (in this case, mitral stenosis) and not as a sick man: 
 
The disease is treated, but Henry Jones, lying awake nights while he worries about his 
wife and children, represents a problem that is much more complex than the pathologic 
physiology of mitral stenosis, and he is apt to improve very slowly unless a discerning 
intern happens to discover why it is that even large doses of digitalis fail to slow his heart 
rate. Henry happens to have heart disease, but he is not disturbed so much by dyspnea as 
he is by anxiety for the future, and a talk with an understanding physician who tries to 
make the situation clear to him, and then gets the social service worker to find a suitable 
occupation, does more to straighten him out than a book full of drugs and diets. (“The 
Care of the Patient”)  
 
Not all suffering is caused by disease, and not all who are ill or in pain, severe as their 
condition may seem to others, are suffering. Suffering occurs through the body, yet there are 
many sources of suffering. Often we distinguish existential suffering from physical suffering. 
But, and as Cassell would remind, regardless of the source, once the thing—the severe pain, the 
fear, sense of loss, distress, etc—imbeds itself deep enough, reaches a point where it arrests, 
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suffocates, dissolves a person’s sense of self or self-control, the suffering is indistinguishable. 
Perhaps a young man is existentially suffering because he, on daily basis, begins to think about 
his own smallness in the universe, his inability to connect with those around him, or the certainty 
that he will indeed die one day. These ideas wear him down so much that he begins to feel 
disconnected even from himself, and, recognizing this, falls into a dark depression. Although the 
causes of suffering differ from person to person, the feeling of loss or separation or disintegration 
of personhood is more or less consistent. 
Pain   
We often use pain and suffering interchangeably—“the pain and suffering that she 
felt…that he endured”—and not without reason, as these two are certainly related and often 
indistinguishable. The temporal aspect of pain—how long it must be endured—as well as not 
knowing what is causing the pain are both important factors that contribute to the emergence of 
suffering from such pain sensations: “People in pain frequently report suffering from pain when 
they feel out of control, when the pain is overwhelming, when the source of pain is unknown, 
when the meaning of the pain is dire, or when the pain is apparently without end. In these 
situations persons perceive pain as a threat to their continued existence—not merely to their lives 
but their integrity as a person” (Cassell 35).  
Whereas suffering is an affliction of persons, pain is of the body—or rather, pain is felt in 
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the body; it can be pinpointed, ascribed to a particular location in the body. Suffering, too, may 
have bodily symptoms, where the feelings of fear, of anxiety, of panic have a direct physiologic 
effect, e.g. the tightness in her chest, his raised blood pressure, the nausea in her stomach. But 
pain can be experimentally investigated and interrupted, and thus pain is relatively well 
understood on a molecular, cellular, and physiological level. A biologist’s definition of pain 
might have something to do with pain receptors called nociceptors, a signaling network called 
the anterolateral system, and the different locations in the brain where this information is 
received and processed.  
Yet while much is known, the subject of pain remains a perplexing and actively studied 
area of research. Not least in its complexity is the subjectivity of pain (and this is where we 
approach the limits of what science can really know about a person’s experience, where the 
realms of the purely subjective and the purely objective clash). We know that different people 
have different tolerances to pain, and in various situations and cultures, responses to and 
conceptions of pain vary greatly. Neuroscientists recognize that the “perception of pain is subject 
to central modulation…(and) that such ‘psychological’ effects are as real and important as any 
other neural phenomenon” (Neuroscience 223). A Cartesian model of mind/body starts to break 
down with this notion that “pain is in the brain.”  
A phenomenological understanding of pain considers how pain alters our relationship to 
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our bodies: “No event more radically and inescapably reminds us of our bodily presence” (Leder 
76). At the same time, as noted before, “pain effects a certain alienation” and makes our bodies 
feel foreign or separate—the pain is an “it” rather than an “I” (76). Leder points out that this 
distancing can have a relieving or protective element to it; by experiencing the painful body as an 
“it,” this threat or disruption is separated or distant from the “essential self.” And so while the 
gaze of the physician tends to objectify the body, scrutinizing and probing it parts and pieces, we 
begin to do this with our own pain experiences, before we even visit the physician at the clinic 
(77).  
While the distinction may not always be clear, and while we tend to group the two 
together, as they are often inextricable, pain and suffering are not the same. To summarize, pain 
can usually be traced to the body, whereas suffering is an affliction of the person (Cassell). Not 
all who experience pain suffer, and not all who suffer, suffer because of pain. Most simply, the 
relationship of pain and suffering is that of a stimulus (pain) eliciting a sensory response 
(nociceptive pathway) that then is incorporated into a person’s experience (the self body and the 
scope of one’s awareness). This incorporation makes the pain available for the “assignation of 
meaning”—and it is thus through giving meaning to this pain that suffering arises (Braude, 
“Affecting the body and transforming desire”).  
Death 
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“Woe, destruction, ruin, and decay; the worst is death, and death will have his day” 
(Shakespeare, Richard II, Act 3.2, line 102). Although some people see death as a welcome 
freedom from the toils, struggles, and abuses they experience in life, and others, as the promise 
of an eternal life or as the release of their soul from an imprisoning body, death, by definition, is 
the ultimate threat to a person’s intactness. For many people, the idea of death, and the 
correlative limitations of a mortal life, is a profound source of fear and anxiety, of suffering—
“the self-apprehension of mortal life”…or simply that one, and everything that one knows, will 
cease to exist (Schmidt 134). Seemingly, each injury and sickness is a reminder of this: “As the 
sensation of pain is the harbinger of illness, and as illness foretells the coming of death, so the 
alien presence of the body expands until it can threaten the entirety of one’s world” (Leder 83).  
The loss of a person’s identity or familiar relationship to the world, such as is 
experienced in illness, as Leder points out, simply serves as a reminder of the fate that all of us 
eventually face. Consider Steve Nash once more. As he becomes aware that he no longer fits into 
the world of the NBA and that it will continue on without him, he also begins to gain this sense 
of closeness to death, though he cannot quite articulate or grasp what it is: “I can see it out the 
corner of my mind’s eye. It’s like this dark presence. And I don’t want to sound mystical, but I 
feel this sense of something, you know, blocking me, or slowing me down, or troubling me” (The 
Finish Line). 
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The certainty of death, however, is precisely that which gives life meaning; it illuminates 
the dimensions of our life that are obscured by the distractions of living. Our bodies, for 
example, are built in such a way that the very parts keeping us alive—our hearts, brains, livers, 
and, even more seemingly remote our cells, proteins, and DNA—are hidden from view: “Life 
itself is allied to a certain concealment, a withdrawal and protection of its vital center” (Leder 
45). Unless we are severely injured, with, say, our guts hanging out of our stomach, our vital 
forces are kept out of sight. So paradoxically, while life conceals itself, death acts as the 
magician pulling the rabbit from the depths of his top hat—it reveals. 
The anatomists of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, Foucault describes, found that 
only by “opening up a few corpses” could the nature of a disease and the machinery of the body 
be truthfully understood: “Knowledge of life finds its origin in the destruction of life and in its 
extreme opposite; it is at death that disease and life speak their truth: a specific, irreducible truth, 
protected from all assimilations to the inorganic by the circle of death that designates them for 
what they are” (145). Our nature is to survive and to persist—even with all the advanced 
technologies we have today, allowing us peer inside our bodies while we are still alive, our 
inclination to deny and avoid death stifles any such revealing powers until death itself demands 
our acute attention. 
While the foregoing describes our understanding of the organic body (the Korper), this is 
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also true for the lived body (the Leib): our lives become precious, meaningful, something to be 
protected or preserved, only because of death. As Dr. Rita Charon, internist and professor of 
narrative medicine, explains, “Those things that give us meaning…are only available through the 
presence of death” (“Honoring the stories of illness”). While we are consumed in the day-to-day 
concerns of living, we are not usually reflecting upon who we actually are—we just are. It is not 
until we take a moment of pause from our daily routines, prompted by an event such as death of 
a friend, natural disaster, or illness, that we, even momentarily, develop a sense of what gives our 
lives meaning, i.e. what they are for.  
As long as we are in denial of death, or are afraid to acknowledge, accept, and confront it, 
we remain handicapped from truly developing a sense of meaning or seeing what it is that makes 
our lives something worth caring for and preserving. To know what we are, we must consider 
what we are not. And we must be able to fully accept death in order to truly gain our sense of 
being alive—“For whoever wants to save his life will lose it” (Matthew 16:25).  
Many physicians, like Charon and Cassell, see patients suffering from illnesses such as 
cancer, where prognoses are not often positive (though these days are increasingly becoming so) 
and where the fear of death is palpable. These physicians recognize the space that is opened by 
the presence of death: “The physical suffering simply exposes an underlying suffering that is 
present all the time…that I think many of us, many of my patients, don’t recognize until they’re 
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facing death. And then it becomes a terror, and it becomes part of my job as a doctor to be able 
to recognize with them all the elements of their suffering” (Charon).  
The clinical encounter  
As we have seen, pain and illness affect not just our flesh and our blood, but our entire 
experience of being-in-the-world. Our relationships with others and even with our own body are 
altered by these physical perturbations. Illness exposes us, explains Charon: “You’re down to the 
floor of who you are in the presence of illness” (“Honoring the stories of illness”). The clinical 
encounter thus places the physician in a unique position of close contact with a patient—that is, 
there is little separating a physician from a patient who has been stripped bare by illness and 
seeks a return to health (to wholeness, to a familiar sense of being in the world). Charon talks of 
the contact that she has made with her patients “through the glare of death.” Such intimacy is not 
often experienced between two persons on a daily basis:  
 
The goal of the medical meeting is that which separates it from most other kinds of 
meetings, other ways of being-together-in-the-world…The patient, who comes looking 
for help, is distressed, suffering and often afraid because of what is happening to him. 
The dialogue and examination will have to deal with intimate parts of life, parts which 
one would normally only share with someone one knew very well, or perhaps with no 
one at all…Deep trust, despite estrangement and asymmetry, is therefore a necessary 
feature of the medical meeting. (Svenaeus 147) 
 
In The Hermeneutics of Medicine and the Phenomenology of Health, Fredrik Svenaeus 
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delves into the topic of the clinical encounter and the use of 1) phenomenology to better 
understand health and illness and 2) hermeneutics to better make sense of the “interpretive 
meeting” that is the clinical encounter. While much is to be said on the topic of hermeneutics—a 
theory of interpretation—and clinical medicine, that is mostly outside the present scope of this 
paper. Svenaeus’ work, however, is worth mentioning here because of his relevant ideas on the 
clinical encounter, most notably, and put most simply, that the practice of clinical medicine “can 
be best understood as an interpretive meeting between health-care personnel and patient” (2). 
Different from the interpretive act that takes place with the close reading of a text, this 
interpretive meeting is one between two subjects, both with the aim of healing the sick patient. 
Although the physician and the patient engage in this meeting with different points of view—
“the doctor’s world…is primarily one of disease, while the patient’s world is one of lived 
illness”—both necessarily contribute to the end goal of the encounter: “the patient and not the 
doctor experiences this unhomelikeness (basic to the illness experience) in his being-in-the-
world, and this unhomelikeness is also the matter of the meeting…(while) the doctor’s expertise 
and mission (is) to help in matters concerning health and disease, which is not present in the 
horizon of the patient” (153-154). 
To recall the problem of “biologizing,” the physician’s focus on the disease has become 
an issue when his or her sole focus is on the disease, rather than engaging in this dialogue with 
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the patient in order to better understand the illness experience of the patient. The deficiency of 
medicine to treat the patient and not simply the disease results in part because of the 
“asymmetric” nature of the doctor-patient relationship—the patient is in a position of weakness, 
seeking the help of the physician, and lacks the knowledge about his or her prevailing condition 
that the physician or health care worker can provide (153). This imbalance of power (between 
the two subjects; harkens back to Foucault) makes it easier for the perspective, focus, or 
language of the dominant party (the physician) to supersede the narrative of the often relegated 
lived body experience of the deferential party (the patient).  
Role of the physician 
The physician is trained to see the disease, perturbation, or imbalance in the body of the 
patient. This is the physician’s expertise—and a complex and difficult one to gain at that, for the 
knowledge we now have about the biology, physiology, and pathology of the human body is 
substantial and only continues to grow. With the development and use of increasingly 
sophisticated technologies, however, the physician is simultaneously able to see more while 
doing less in a number of specialties. At the same time, the need for and prevalence of 
subspecialists (and fewer generalists) has grown substantially with these new technologies. The 
establishment of science and technology as the base of clinical practice has been so successful 
and so widely applicable that “we have come to largely consider science and technology to be 
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medicine, a stance that underlies some of our problems, including the dismay of some physicians 
and many of our patients” (Barondess 8).  
But as we have seen repeatedly, medical practice cannot be treated the same as medical 
science. The privilege and the burden of the practitioner of medicine is the centrality of the 
patient. The experience of the person and his or her “illness-related human needs,” in addition to 
the disease itself, demands the attention and expertise of the physician (8). As indicated before, 
the same disease will manifest differently in different people, and thus the required or best-
deemed treatment will also vary. The challenge of the practitioner of medicine, of the clinician, 
then, is to balance a hefty corpus of scientific knowledge with an intricate understanding of and 
care for humanity. To recall Peabody’s famous words, “One of the essential qualities of the 
clinician is interest in humanity, for the secret of the care of the patient is in caring for the 
patient” (“The Care of the Patient,” 1927).  
This essential aspect of clinical medicine is by no means easy to achieve or uphold, and 
there are times when the focus of a particular physician does not call for it: 1) certain specialists, 
such as a pathologist or surgeon, spend much less time, and some might have little to no time, 
interacting with patients; 2) the ability to take the time to engage in a meaningful dialogue, in 
which a patient is able to tell his or her story, is not always realistic, especially in a busy clinic or 
fast-paced hospital; and 3) the current climate of health care, with increased scrutiny and tedious 
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paperwork from insurance companies as well as other costs, etc, makes it especially difficult to 
remain dedicated to the care of the patient (Barondess 7). Having acknowledged these 
challenges, the physician still must be dedicated to the ultimate goal of medicine—the restoration 
of health and the alleviation of suffering—even if that requires extra work in today’s climate. 
Some are critical of the role of the physician to help the patient restore his or her 
relationship to the world through such a dialogical interaction (as called for by Svenaeus). In his 
lecture on the treatment of suffering in medicine, for example, Dr. Hillel Braude, physician and 
professor of clinical ethics, cites psychologist and philosopher Karl Jaspers’ criticism of the role 
of the physician to treat meaning (“Affecting the body and transforming desire”). However, as 
Dr. Charon says, her role as a physician is one of both expert and companion: “What medicine is 
for is to donate expertise…to give someone company, and to form staunch, sturdy 
affiliations…so no one has to be in the glare of sickness, of death, alone” (“Honoring the stories 
of illness”).   
This partnership is also one in which the physician helps the patient not only to recognize 
the elements of his or her illness and/or suffering, but also to adapt to his or her prevailing 
condition, to work with the physician (or other medical practitioner) to once again find a state of 
health. A 2009 editorial in The Lancet references Georges Canguilhem (1904-1995), French 
philosopher and physician, who believed that health is defined by the person and not the doctor, 
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according to his or her needs: “The role of the doctor is to help the individual adapt to their 
unique prevailing conditions. This should be the meaning of ‘personalized medicine’” (“What is 
health?”).   
Agency of the patient  
As discussed, illness interrupts a person’s usual relationship with the world—our familiar 
“being-in-the-world” is thrown askew by the disruptive nature of pain or disease (Aho and Aho; 
Leder; Toombs). At times, the illness or pain can be all-encompassing, where the world is so 
blocked out, the awareness so restricted to the ailing body, that the sufferer cannot see or even 
think about anything but the thralls of his or her condition. But even for a person in this state, 
this illness-entrapment, there most likely will be a moment, however brief or fleeting, when he or 
she pauses or reflects upon his or her condition. It most likely is not a profound “Aha!” moment 
(though it certainly could be); it may simply be a thought of sadness or of longing to be rid of 
this illness, to return once more to a state of health, not only to be able to do the activities that 
have been suspended but also to address facets of his or her life that had been previously 
neglected…perhaps this illness has awoken the person to the brevity of life. It is precisely in this 
simple and brief moment that that person, longing for a state of health, becomes aware of his or 
her life in a way that he or she most likely was not aware of before. As with death, illness 
heightens our sensibility of the things in our lives that matter most to us—it opens up a space or 
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separation, even if momentarily, where the once invisible, or hidden from view, becomes visible 
to us (Leder; Foucault).  
Illness makes us conscious of that which was unconscious to us our whole lives—our self 
in relationship to the world. This aspect of illness, its disruption and separation and the longing 
for health that follows, places a demand on the person to respond: answer to these changes 
(adapt, as Canguilhem says) or remain in this state of suffering. Canguilhem’s definition of 
health, “as the ability to adapt to one’s environment,” puts the onus not on the physician but on 
the patient to conduct a response to his or her illness (or pain, etc): “It puts the individual patient, 
not the doctor, in a position of self-determining authority to define his or her health needs. The 
doctor becomes a partner in delivering those needs” (“What is health?”).  
In addition to this, we can also consider that implicit in the nature of suffering is the 
reality that we can never fully understand another’s suffering. Suffering is ultimately a personal 
affliction, i.e. those things that threaten one person’s sense of intactness differ in someone else, 
and to truly know another’s suffering we would need to truly know that person: 
 
To know in what way others are suffering demands an exhaustive understanding of what 
makes them the individuals they are—when they feel themselves whole, threatened, or 
disintegrated as well as their view of the future, the past, others, the environment, and 
their aims and purposes. Given its almost infinite complexity, this may appear 
impossible; after all, we usually do not even know these things about ourselves. (Cassell 
198)  
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 This task, though perhaps inherently incomplete (that is, that suffering can not be wholly 
eliminated), need not be rendered impossible. It requires, as we have seen, not just the action or 
the direction of the physician (and the passive submission of the patient), but also (and no less 
importantly) the active participation of the patient. In order to address a person’s suffering, that 
person must be able to acknowledge what it is that is causing the distress or uncontrollable fear 
that is so threatening—simultaneously recognizing that which is meaningful in that person’s life 
(Cassell).  
It is important to note also, though, that many people are of course limited by a number 
of different factors in their abilities not only to cogently and effectively express their experiences 
to a physician but also to gain access to healthcare at all: mental disability, history of abuse, 
language barriers, socioeconomic status, lack of education, geography, and so on. Even in the 
seemingly most unfair or uncontrollable situations, however, a person (a patient, a sick person, a 
dying person) still has some degree of agency, however tiny and undetectable, to choose how to 
respond or to adapt to his or her prevailing condition.  
Our expectations 
Understanding the complexity and many sources of suffering, then, we must remember, 
as Svenaeus points out, that medicine can deal with suffering and the perceived threats to a 
person’s integrity only so far as they are related to illnesses of these people—“Happiness and 
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integrity in general cannot be the goals of medicine, since this would expand the activities of the 
clinic in an absurd and even threatening way” (121). We often expect that the happiness and 
freedom from pain take care of themselves when we visit a physician or seek medical 
intervention. This is hardly ever the case. One source of the suffering might be eliminated, and 
we might feel considerably happier, e.g. back pain that was the root of one man’s anguish for 
years is gone after surgery or a series of steroid injections. (And perhaps having these basic 
expectations of happiness and comfort as the normal state, and our sometimes-entitled sense to 
have this normality restored, is a problem that needs addressing in its own right.)  
But in the sense that we expect there to be a medical solution to every discomfort we 
might feel throughout our lives, we risk two things: 1) that by continuously medicating 
ourselves, by perpetually numbing or seeking to numb ourselves from every natural pain of life, 
we risk not allowing ourselves those moments of pause or separation from our lives that often 
can only be experienced through illness and pain (not to say the latter experiences are good, but 
rather that without some sort of struggle or reflection or search for meaning, we do reduce 
ourselves to little more than our biology). And 2) we risk conditioning ourselves with the 
expectation that there is or will be a cure for everything. Maybe it will be possible to cure most, 
if not all, diseases sometime in the future—the advancements made in medical science in the past 
decade alone suggest that this can be achieved. But, again, this sets up an expectant mindset that 
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we can “cure” everything—the “quick fix” mindset, which threatens to prevent us from 
developing, ironically, our humanness.  
To a degree, however, some of these expectations must face the realities that the very 
same science is showing us: “given that we now know the important influence of the human 
genome in disease, even the most optimistic health advocate surely has to accept the 
impossibility of risk-free wellbeing” (“What is health?”). Additionally, because we can now 
better see how central the person is to medicine, and how uncertainty inherently accompanies 
“person,” we must reincorporate and become more comfortable with the concept of uncertainty: 
“A medicine focused on the sick or well person is a medicine that would once again be plagued 
by an irreducible element of uncertainty that cannot be dismissed, and for which there is no 
technical fix” (Cassell xiii). 
Uncertainty and the nature of science  
The greatest scientific minds have acknowledged that we can never be fully certain about 
anything—or rather, that there is always the possibility that a theory is wrong, e.g. it only takes 
one black swan to dismantle the premise that all swans are white (Karl Popper). The field of 
quantum physics tells us that, on a fundamental level, nothing is known with absolute certainty, 
e.g. the Heisenberg uncertainty principle states that the more precisely the position of some 
particle is determined, the less precisely its momentum can be known, and vice versa. Some 
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things can be known with more certainty than others, and it becomes a matter of determining 
what these things are. But in the clinic, laboratory, or operating room, uncertainty is always 
present. A scientist or a surgeon knows that anything they do or think they know can be easily 
disproved, or rather that something else can be found to be more true. A surgeon well attuned to 
his craft will articulate the risks and limitations of a particular surgery to a particular patient (e.g. 
a woman who is 87 will not have the same chances of recovery as a woman of 63 from the same 
hip replacement surgery).  
Although questioning and uncertainty have been foundational for the progress of science, 
the great successes, the number of things science or medicine has been fairly certain about—and 
that are currently accepted as “fact”—tend to outweigh or outlast the thousands of other things 
science thought certain that were proved otherwise or claimed right and proved wrong. Thus the 
role of uncertainty in science is not well translated to those outside of science. The “combination 
of ambiguity and authority (is) implicit in science;” the issue has been, however, in conveying 
this to the public, in making it okay that something is not known (Mnookin 159).  
The constant verifying of facts, the act striving to know something with as much certainty 
as possible, the over-glorification of objectivity—these aspects of science are what have 
dominated and “helped perpetuate impersonality in medicine” (Cassell xiii). The uncertainty 
implicit in the nature and process of science, on the other hand, has not translated in this same 
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way. And this assumption of certainty has contributed both to the expectations of people 
demanding help in their state of suffering (or simply discomfort or illness or pain) and the 
desperation of people looking for answers without really grasping the problem.  
Conclusion  
 In attempts to maintain and preserve ourselves, we have undoubtedly contributed to the 
dismantling and deconstruction of that vital center we thought we were protecting: our 
humanness. While many physicians are aware of the need to be more compassionate, empathetic, 
and engaged with their patients, many lack the necessary “language for articulating this 
knowledge in a systematical way” (Svenaeus 5). Phenomenologists have, for some time now, 
been developing a vocabulary that would be useful to physicians to improve these relationships. 
One step towards a solution to this problem of the “biologizing” of the sick person and 
the subsequent lack of empathy for that person’s suffering, would be the incorporation of this 
“language of phenomenology” into medical practice. Kleinman’s problem with phenomenology 
is its “predilection for an esoteric terminology,” its inability to be understood, not necessarily 
because of content (it is dealing with first-person experience after all) but because of its 
language. Such inaccessibility has long plagued medicine and other such fields, as Foucault 
points what out happened with medical knowledge in the 18/19th centuries:  
 
Before it became a corpus of knowledge (un savior), the clinic was a universal 
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relationship of mankind with itself: the age of absolute happiness for medicine. And the 
decline began when writing and secrecy were introduced, that is, the concentration of this 
knowledge in a privileged group…what was known was no longer communicated to 
others and put to practical use once it had passed through the esotericism of knowledge. 
(55) 
 
A number of medical schools are developing “courses in patient communication, medical 
ethics, and medical humanities…(and) departments of medical education are now part of medical 
faculties that train their members to incorporate these ideals into their courses” (Thomas 10). A 
shift is slowly being made in medical education to further merge the knowledge of the 
physiologic body with the lived body—a move that perhaps one day can translate to the wider 
public, to the people most affected by their fear of death, most absorbed in the task of living, and 
least aware of their sources of meaning.  
While the nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw great advances in medicine by cutting 
open the body, an act that both revealed and “demonstrated the miraculous complexities of 
human biology,” Cassell believes that the focus needs to be on the person in the century to come: 
“A central task for the twenty-first century is the discovery of the person—finding the sources of 
illness within the person, generating methods for the relief of illness from that knowledge and 
revealing the power within the person as the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have revealed the 
power of the body” (163).  
Although there is room for improvement, science and medicine do play a role in the 
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alleviation of suffering as it relates to illness—the rest, though, is left up to some other discipline 
and, ultimately, to the individual. When a body is sick, a person’s relationship to and in the world 
changes. In this separation or pause that illness creates, there is an opening up of space for a 
person to better see aspects of his or her life, otherwise hidden, as when faced with death. 
Indeed, each of us is threatened by death every day, but it is not usually until we are directly 
confronted by it, through illness or loss, that we feel its true weight and can, in turn, directly 
confront it. It is in this recognition of death, and the comfort and relief that we all, on some level, 
require, that the physician can then play a role in helping the patient to realize what it is that is 
causing his or her suffering. And in recognizing this, a person subsequently recognizes what it is 
that he or she finds meaningful—for the suffering reveals the aspects of a person that are held 
closest, the most fragile.  
When we reach the point when all we can realize is that we know so little, becoming fully 
aware of our “mortal life,” we can in turn find a means to see that to which we are bound and 
that for which we strive…for if we did not have these limitations, “we would know nothing 
outside of ourselves, and so also nothing of ourselves” (Holderlin, Hyperion).   
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